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Every program start

LD_PRELOAD and ld.so.preload: Linux Persistence

How attackers use /etc/ld.so.preload, ld.so.conf.d and LD_PRELOAD to load a library into every program, and how to find and remove it on a Linux host.

MITRE ATT&CK
T1574.006
Tactics
Persistence, Privilege escalation, Defense evasion
Runs
Every program start
Set up by
Users and root
Locations
  • /etc/ld.so.preload
  • /etc/ld.so.conf
  • /etc/ld.so.conf.d/*.conf
  • /etc/environment

How it works

Every dynamically linked program starts in the dynamic linker (ld.so, for example /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2). Before it resolves the program's own dependencies, it loads preload objects, in this order: the libraries named in the LD_PRELOAD environment variable, those given with --preload when ld.so is run directly, and those listed, whitespace-separated, in /etc/ld.so.preload. A preloaded library's symbols take precedence over libc's, so it can replace readdir(), fopen(), accept() or pam_authenticate() in every process that loads it.

The two preload routes differ in reach:

  • /etc/ld.so.preload applies to every dynamically linked program on the host, set-user-ID binaries included, from the next execve(). No restart, no reboot.
  • LD_PRELOAD (and its sibling LD_AUDIT, which loads rtld-audit libraries) applies only to processes that inherit the variable. In secure-execution mode (setuid, setgid, file capabilities), ld.so ignores entries containing a slash and only loads set-user-ID libraries from the standard directories.

The library search path is a third lever. ld.so resolves dependencies through DT_RPATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DT_RUNPATH, then the cache /etc/ld.so.cache, then the default directories. ldconfig builds that cache from /etc/ld.so.conf, which on Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL and Fedora is little more than include /etc/ld.so.conf.d/*.conf. Package installs that ship libraries rerun ldconfig, so a planted directory goes live at the next one. Statically linked binaries ignore all of this.

Where it lives

PathWhatWho can write it
/etc/ld.so.preloadLibraries loaded into every dynamic program; absent on a stock installroot
/etc/ld.so.confTop-level library path configuration, normally one include lineroot
/etc/ld.so.conf.d/*.confExtra library directories (Debian: libc.conf, x86_64-linux-gnu.conf)root
/etc/ld.so.cacheCompiled cache that ld.so actually readsroot, via ldconfig
/etc/environmentKEY=value pairs set by pam_env at loginroot
/etc/profile, /etc/profile.d/*, /etc/bash.bashrcSystem-wide shell startuproot
~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, ~/.zshrcPer-user shell startupthe user
~/.ssh/environmentRead at SSH login when PermitUserEnvironment is onthe user
/etc/systemd/system/<unit>.d/*.confEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD=… for one serviceroot
/etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/*env_keep decides whether LD_PRELOAD survives sudoroot

How attackers use it

System-wide userland rootkit

The classic: drop a shared object and list it in /etc/ld.so.preload. Its hooks filter readdir() to hide files and /proc/<pid> entries, filter fopen() on /proc/net/tcp to hide connections, and usually hide /etc/ld.so.preload itself. The open-source libprocesshider, used this way by TeamTNT's cryptomining campaigns, hides a miner from ps and top. Symbiote (2022) was likewise preloaded into every process, to hide itself and steal credentials.

$ cat /etc/ld.so.preload
/usr/local/lib/libprocesshider.so

A library folder of the attacker's own

A file in /etc/ld.so.conf.d adds a directory to the cache. A library placed there with the same soname as a system library can shadow it for every program that links it, without touching /etc/ld.so.preload.

# /etc/ld.so.conf.d/00-runtime.conf
/var/lib/.sysd/lib

Ebury took a related route: a trojanized libkeyutils.so that OpenSSH loaded as an ordinary dependency.

LD_PRELOAD in an environment file

Narrower but quieter: a variable that loads a hooking library into one user's shells, or into one service such as sshd to capture passwords.

# appended to ~/.bashrc
export LD_PRELOAD=/home/alice/.cache/fonts/libfc-ext.so
# /etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d/override.conf (sshd.service on RHEL)
[Service]
Environment=LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libsshd-ext.so

Carry-overs into privileged commands

Defaults env_keep += "LD_PRELOAD" in sudoers lets a user inject a library into commands run as root; PermitUserEnvironment yes in sshd_config lets ~/.ssh/environment or an environment="…" key option set it at login. See sudoers and sshd configuration.

How to check a host

On a live host

Every dynamically linked tool you run loads the preloaded library too, so a rootkit can lie to cat, ls and grep. Read the key files with a statically linked binary (busybox from busybox-static; check with file "$(command -v busybox)"), and prefer the offline route below.

busybox cat /etc/ld.so.preload
busybox ls -la /etc/ld.so.preload /etc/ld.so.conf.d/
cat /etc/ld.so.conf /etc/ld.so.conf.d/*.conf
ldconfig -p | grep -vE '=> /(usr/)?lib(32|64)?/'   # cached libraries outside the usual folders
ldd /bin/true                                       # preloaded objects are listed too
grep -laE 'LD_(PRELOAD|AUDIT)=' /proc/[0-9]*/environ
systemctl show-environment
grep -rnsE 'LD_(PRELOAD|AUDIT|LIBRARY_PATH)' /etc/environment /etc/environment.d \
  /etc/profile /etc/profile.d /etc/bash.bashrc /etc/security/pam_env.conf /etc/systemd \
  /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d /root/.bashrc /root/.profile /home/*/.bashrc \
  /home/*/.profile /home/*/.zshrc /home/*/.ssh/environment

ldconfig -p only prints the cache; avoid plain ldconfig on a suspect host, since it rewrites the cache and the links.

Offline or from a collection

A mounted image is not under the rootkit's control, so /etc/ld.so.preload shows what it really contains. No Debian, Ubuntu or RHEL package ships that file: any content needs an owner, such as a known product (the Snoopy command logger installs itself there). For each library it names:

  • ownership: dpkg -S <path> or rpm -qf <path>, and dpkg -V <pkg> or rpm -Vf <path> for the packaged ones;
  • exported symbols: readelf -W --dyn-syms lib.so listing libc names such as readdir64, fopen or pam_authenticate is a hook;
  • times: stat the library, the preload file and /etc/ld.so.conf.d/* (mtime and ctime), and look for other files created in the same minute.

Linux Persistence reads these files offline from an archive made with the collection command and lists every preload entry and unusual library folder.

What Linux Persistence flags

The parser reads /etc/ld.so.preload, /etc/ld.so.conf and /etc/ld.so.conf.d/*. Every library in the preload file becomes an entry; in the ld.so.conf files, include lines and glob patterns are skipped, and directories under the standard library folders (/lib, /usr/lib, /usr/local/lib, their lib32/lib64 and multiarch variants) or /opt are only listed when another flag hits.

  • Library preloaded system-wide: every library listed in /etc/ld.so.preload, always (high). An empty file shows as empty, with no entry.
  • Unusual library folder: a directory in ld.so.conf or ld.so.conf.d outside the standard folders (medium).
  • Runs from a temporary folder: the path is under /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm or /run/user/<uid> (high).
  • Runs from a hidden folder: a dot-named file or folder in the path, other than the usual application folders in a home directory (medium).
  • Sets LD_PRELOAD: an LD_PRELOAD= or LD_AUDIT= assignment in a shell startup file, /etc/environment, a systemd Environment= line, a crontab variable line, ~/.ssh/environment or a forced command (high); these entries are listed under their own mechanism.
  • sudo keeps LD_PRELOAD, PermitUserEnvironment on, SSH environment file and Key sets environment variables report the sudo and SSH carry-overs.
  • Not installed by any package: an unowned file in /etc/ld.so.conf.d (low); Differs from package package: a packaged file such as /etc/ld.so.conf whose checksum changed (low). Both need /var/lib/dpkg in the collection; RPM databases are not read. Flags inside unmodified packaged files are shown as info only.
  • Changed date: the file changed within 7 days before the newest file in the collection (low).

Limits: the tool reads configuration, not libraries. It does not hash or disassemble the .so files, read /etc/ld.so.cache, /etc/environment.d or systemd's DefaultEnvironment=, or see what running processes have mapped. The pam_env.conf form LD_PRELOAD DEFAULT=… is matched too.

Cleaning up

  1. Preserve first. Capture memory if you can (the loaded rootkit lives there), then copy /etc/ld.so.preload, the listed libraries and any planted ld.so.conf.d file with their times (cp -a, or tar from rescue media) and record sha256sum and stat output.
  2. Check lsattr for the immutable bit; rootkits often set it. Clearing it and editing from rescue media or the mounted disk avoids a rootkit that hooks unlink() to protect its files.
  3. Remove the line, or the whole file if nothing legitimate is listed, then delete the library. If ld.so meets a listed library that no longer exists it prints an error and carries on, so a stale line does not break the system.
  4. Run ldconfig after removing a planted ld.so.conf.d file, and restart or reboot: running processes keep the library mapped.
  5. Look for the same library or a re-installer elsewhere: shell startup files, systemd drop-ins, cron, sudoers env_keep, ~/.ssh/environment, and PAM modules if the hooks targeted authentication.
  6. Rotate what the hooks could see: passwords typed on the host, SSH keys and tokens used through sshd or sudo.

References

See also

On Linux Forensics

The artifacts behind this technique, in the Linux Forensics reference: